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centres. Although the book’s epilogue briefly discusses the demographic 
decline of south Wales Jewry throughout the twentieth century, a fuller 
examination of this aspect of Welsh Jewish history is needed. This is 
suggested by Henriques herself: “There is more to be discovered yet of the 
life of these people, especially during the period of the long decline” (p. ix). 
Moreover, contrasting the Jewish experience in Wales to its counterparts 
in other parts of the United Kingdom would also allow us to appreciate the 
important role played by place in shaping British Jewish history, and shed 
light on the complexity and diversity of Jewish life in Britain. Despite its 
obvious weaknesses, The Jews of South Wales has provided a good basis for 
further enquiry into the field of Welsh Jewish history, and British Jewish 
history more generally.
Cai Parry-Jones
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This is a revelatory book, which comprehensively details Britain’s conten-
tious and anguished moment in Palestine as ruler and colonizer. In one 
sense this is a solid “old-fashioned” factual overview of British policy 
during the thirty years of the Mandate in that it revives issues that are 
cursorily glossed over in post-modernist literature about this period, 
whose authors would otherwise have to acknowledge that the servants of 
the British Empire and Zionist leaders did not read from the same hymn 
book. Neither does the central Palestinian Arab leadership between 1933 
and 1945 come out of this smelling of roses – their seduction of the Nazis 
began shortly after Hitler’s ascendency to power in 1933.
Michael Cohen’s book is unconventional in that it looks at the third 
side of the Israel–Palestine triangle. It examines the conflict primarily 
from the British side and is not simply a rendition of the evolution of the 
Israel–Palestine conflict from a Zionist or Arab nationalist perspective. 
Thus the persona of Churchill, for example, is central to this period. While 
sympathetic to Zionism and often hostile to Arab nationalism, he clearly 
placed British interests, the preservation of the Empire, and halting the 
advance of both fascism and Bolshevism before all else.
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This work is studded with examples of the antisemitic innuendo of the 
inter-war British ruling class, which tried to fit the Jews into the straitjacket 
of the colonized – and became exasperated when the often better educated 
Jews refused to play the role expected of them. From the Foreign Secretary, 
Arthur Balfour, to the proprietor of the Daily Mail, Lord Northcliffe, to the 
intelligentsia and literati, including George Orwell, H. G. Wells, Rudyard 
Kipling, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Agatha Christie, and many others, all 
looked upon the Jew as an alien weed planted in the garden of Western 
civilization. Devout Catholics like Sir Michael McDonnell, the Chief 
Justice in Palestine, initiated a campaign to hound the Jewish Attorney-
General, Norman Bentwich, out of the country. Cohen has discovered 
that the private letters of Sir John Hope-Simpson were “tinged with anti-
Semitism”, yet Hope-Simpson was appointed by the Foreign Office to 
report on land settlement development and immigration into Palestine in 
the aftermath of the riots and killings of 1929, known among Jews, after 
the letters corresponding to the Hebrew year, as Tarpat. He believed that 
the Jews in Palestine were merely the advance guard of the Communist 
subversion of the Empire.
Churchill plays an ambiguous role in Cohen’s narrative. He believed 
in the overweening power of American Jews to influence events in 
Washington and beyond. He detested internationalist Jews as a distinct 
category of Bolshevism and Jewishness, and seemingly unwittingly 
employed a member of the British Union of Fascists to ghost-write an 
article on Jews. Cohen further examines the complex nature of Churchill’s 
tenure in Downing Street. On the one hand, he was able to push through, 
against almost unanimous opposition in the cabinet (which feared 
the reaction of both the Arabs and the Nazis), a plan for the creation of 
a Jewish military division to fight the Nazis. In part, Churchill thought 
that this initiative would impress American Jews and facilitate the entry 
of the US into the war. In part, he entertained the possibility that this 
would release eleven battalions of the British garrison in Palestine which 
could then return to defend the home country against a potential Nazi 
invasion. On the other hand, Churchill played along with the delaying 
tactics of the real opponents of the Jewish Division until the crises had 
passed – until the USSR had entered the war and when a deep relationship 
had been forged with the Americans. He then offered no words of dissen-
sion when the cabinet finally cancelled the plan for a Jewish Division in 
October 1941.
Churchill was much more critical in his postwar writings, which, of 
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course, were intended for public show. In his memoirs, he was persuaded 
to drop the following paragraph: “All our military men disliked the Jews 
and loved the Arabs. General Wavell was no exception. Some of my most 
trusted Ministers like Lord Lloyd, and, of course, the Foreign Office, were 
all pro-Arab, if they were not actually anti-Semitic” (cited p. 85).
Yet during the war he bowed to Foreign Office hostility to the idea that 
Jews from occupied Europe should enter Palestine for fear of offend-
ing the Arab world – an often pro-German Arab world. Thus, as Henry 
Morgenthau Jr, the US Secretary of the Treasury, records in his diary, 
Churchill refused to abrogate the 1939 White Paper or to raise the 
ceiling on the immigration quota. This blocked the possible passage of 
Hungarian Jews into Palestine in August 1944, an endangered community 
then under recent Nazi occupation.
What Churchill’s real beliefs about Jews and Zionism were remains 
unclear. Were they static or did they change? Was support for the Zionists 
merely attached to the ebb and flow of British national interests? If he was 
able to overrule opponents of Zionism on some occasions, why not on 
others?
Cohen devotes several pages to British knowledge about the Nazi 
attempt to exterminate European Jewry, both before and after the Wannsee 
conference. He and others have argued that antisemitism was rife within 
the British establishment and that any early attempts to negotiate an 
exodus of Jews were frowned upon since they might result in Britain being 
swamped by Jewish immigrants. Cohen closely examines the refusal to 
bomb the railway lines to Auschwitz-Birkenau in the summer of 1944. 
He takes issue with the accepted view that this proposition had not come 
within the purview of Churchill’s “daily scrutiny”. Cohen points out that 
a week after Churchill had instructed Eden “to get what you can out of the 
RAF”, he also sent identical letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury and 
to Lord Melchett in which he repeated the official mantra that the killing 
of Jews would only be ended by a speedy victory of the Allies. But what 
if by then there were no longer any Jews to liberate? Cohen writes: “Had 
Churchill been willing in August 1944 to divert to Auschwitz-Birkenau 
just a handful of the RAF planes that flew to Warsaw (under his personal 
orders and supervision), the moral history of World War II would have 
been radically different” (p. 353).
The Zionists were therefore decidedly disillusioned by the war’s end. 
The Allies may have won the war, but the Jews certainly lost it. Cohen 
further dissects Churchill’s views after the war. In a debate in the House of 
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Commons on 1 August 1946, Churchill argued that “a vast dumping of the 
Jews of Europe into Palestine” would not solve the Jewish problem – and 
that the idea that the survivors should remain in the countries in which 
they grew up should still be entertained.
Two chapters are devoted to “The Arabs and Nazi Germany” and to the 
Mufti during his wartime sojourn in Berlin. This certainly adds to our 
knowledge as delineated by the work of scholars such as Francis Nicosia 
and the late Zvi Elpeleg. Cohen asks the vexed question of what would 
have happened if Rommel had been successful in defeating the British at 
El Alamein. SS Lt. Colonel Walter Rauff, an experienced exterminator of 
Jews, and his Einsatzgruppe were on stand-by, ready to fly to Palestine. His 
orders were to continue “the destruction of the Jews begun in Europe with 
the energetic assistance of Arab collaborators” (p. 426). Cohen points out 
that some eight thousand Arabs – seven thousand from Palestine – had 
deserted from the British forces and gone into hiding with their weapons. 
They waited for Rommel to arrive – but then how would they have treated 
the Jews of occupied Palestine? After all, the British had no plan to 
evacuate the Jews.
The Mufti met both Himmler and Eichmann in Berlin. The latter even 
gave the Mufti a detailed talk with maps and statistics about the progress 
made in solving the Jewish problem in Europe. Himmler agreed that once 
a Nazi victory had been attained in the Middle East, one of Eichmann’s 
aides would accompany the Mufti to Jerusalem “in order to deal with 
outstanding problems” (p. 425). One member of the Mufti’s staff was 
given a two-hour guided tour of Sachsenhausen concentration camp on 
the outskirts of Berlin. Cohen states that there is also unsubstantiated 
testimony that the Mufti visited Auschwitz, and records that such visits 
created “a very favourable impression” (p. 425).
Michael Cohen has written an incisive, comprehensive and contro-
versial book that upsets both popular and academic apple carts. His 
factual approach notwithstanding, an impressionistic approach strongly 
pervades the book when factual evidence is missing. He certainly pro-
motes the twin notions of “perfidious Albion” and the “abandonment 
of the Jews”. There are occasional slip-ups – Josiah Wedgwood was not 
“a Conservative imperialist” (p. 25) but a Labour MP. Even so, this is an 
important work which certainly serves up intellectual food for thought 
and will no doubt disturb many future students of Middle East studies.
Colin Shindler
